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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH RELEASE OF NAMES OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ABORTION 
PROVIDERS HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF A PATIENT'S RIGHT OF 
PRIVACy-Minnesota Medical Association v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84 
(Minn. 1978). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 1977, a newspaper reporter from the Catholic Bulletin 
requested the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare to provide 
him with a list of all physicians, clinics, and hospitals that had per­
formed abortions for Medicaid1 patients in 1975 and 1976. In addi­
tion, he wanted to know the amount of the state's subsidy for these 
services. The information sought by the journalist was stored on 
computer tapes retained by the Department of Welfare. The de­
partment agreed to provide the information if the Catholic Bulletin 
would prepare the computer program for retrieving the data. 2 
The Minnesota Medical Association and its president objected 
to any disclosure of this information on the grounds that patients' 
and doctors' rights to receive and render medical treatment might 
be jeopardized. They sought a temporary and permanent injunc­
tion in the Ramsey County District Court to prohibit the dissemi­
nation of the information until regulations governing access to 
computer-stored information were adopted. On November 23, 
1977, the court issued a temporary restraining order and an order 
to show cause. Following the hearing on December 14, 1977, the 
court denied the motion for a temporary injunction. Justice E. 
Thomas Brennan held that the information was public, and that 
prohibiting disclosure would impose an unconstitutional prior re­
straint on publication by the Catholic Bulletin. 3 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, con­
1. "Medicaid" is used interchangeably here with state medical assistance pro­
grams. The Medicaid Program, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396-1396i (1976), was developed for the purpose of "making payments to States 
which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, State plans for medical assistance." Id. § 1396. The Minnesota Medical As­
sistance Program was established to comply with and give effect to title XIX. "The 
various terms and provisions hereof, including the amount of medical assistance paid 
hereunder, are intended to comply with and give effect to the program set out in Ti­
tle XIX of the federal Social Security Act." MINN. STAT. § 256B.22 (1971). 
2. 274 N.w.2d 84, 86 (Minn. 1978). 
3. Id. 
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tending that state agencies must adopt rules governing access to 
computer files before releasing any information stored therein. Dis­
closure, they argued, would infringe upon Medicaid patients' pri­
vacy rights and statutory rights to a free choice of physician. It 
would also impair physicians' privacy rights and rights to adminis­
ter medical treatment according to their professional judgment. Al­
though petitioners raised their constitutional arguments in terms of 
both the doctors' and patients' rights, the primary concern was 
with the welfare of needy women who seek state funded abor­
tions. 4 
In Minnesota Medical Association v. State,5 the Minnesota Su­
preme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the injunction. 
Chief Justice Robert J. Sheran, writing for the majority, held that 
information concerning payments to medical assistance providers 
was open to public scrutiny.6 Moreover, the court held that no 
rules governing access to computer files were necessary in this case 
because the procedure concerned only the internal management of 
the agency, and thus, it fell within the exception 'to the statutory 
rulemaking requirement. 7 The court found insufficient evidence to 
establish that disclosure would unconstitutionally infringe upon the 
privacy rights of the patients or the rights of the doctors to admin~ 
4. [d. at 87. 
S. [d. 
6. [d. at 89. The court argued that under the Minnesota Data Privacy Act the 
information could not be considered "private" or "confidential" because there was 
no statute or federal law classifying the information as "not public." [d. at 88 (citing 
MINN. STAT. § IS.162(2)(a), (S)(a) (1977)). Therefore, the court concluded that the in­
formation must be "public data," which means data that is accessible to the public. 
[d. (citing MINN. STAT. § IS.162(S)(a) (1977)). 
Appellants argued that the information was, nonetheless, not "public data" be­
cause the computer tapes on which it was stored did not come within the definition 
of "public records." [d. (citing MINN. STAT. § IS.17(1) (1977)). The statute provides 
that public records shall be made on durable paper, but that they may be photo­
graphed, photostated, microphotographed, or microfilmed, and that reproductions 
may be substituted for the originals. MINN. STAT. § 15.17(1) (1977). No provisions 
are made for computer tapes. The court held, however, that whether records are pub­
lic depends not on the form in which they are kept, but on whether they are "neces­
sary to a full and accurate knowledge" of official activities. 274 N.W.2d at 88 (citing 
MINN. STAT. § IS.17(1) (1977)). All such records must be easily accessible for con­
venient use upon demand of any person. MINN. STAT. § IS.17(4) (1977). 
7. 274 N.W.2d at 90. The statute requires the commissioner to promulgate 
rules, in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, to implement the en­
forcement and administration of the Data Privacy Act. MINN. STAT. § IS.1671 (1977). 
The Administrative Procedures Act, however, in its definition of rules, excludes 
"rules concerning only the internal management of the agency or other agencies, and 
which do not directly affect the rights of or procedure available to the public." [d. § 
IS.0411 (1977). 
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ister medical treatment according to their professional judgments. 
Chief Justice Sheran also determined that official records of med­
ical assistance payments are not so personal as to come within the 
doctors' constitutional right of privacy. 8 
In Minnesota Medical, the Minnesota Supreme Court was 
faced with balancing a woman's right of privacy surrounding the 
abortion decision against the public's right to obtain information 
about government spending for abortions. The court reached its 
decision in favor of disclosure by distinguishing between direct and 
indirect interferences with a woman's privacy rights. The Minne­
sota court recognized that courts are compelled to protect a wom­
an's privacy rights when the state interferes with the abortion deci­
sion. 9 It determined, however, that these same rights wHl not be 
protected when the state interferes with them in an indirect man­
ner, notwithstanding the equally burdensome effects on the abor­
tion decision. This case, therefore,. seriously undermines the pri­
vacy right established in previous abortion cases. Consequently, 
this note addresses the nature of the woman's right of privacy and 
the extent to which the state may intrude in matters affecting her 
exercise of that right. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A woman has the right of privacy in matters of contraception 
and procreation to make certain important decisions free from in­
terference by the state. 10 Although these rights are not articulated 
in the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held in 
Griswold v. Connecticut ll that "specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guaran­
tees that help give them life and substance. "12 Included in these 
8. 274 N.W.2d at 93-94. 
9. Id. at 92 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976)). 
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
11. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
12. There is no definitive statement on the source of the right of privacy. In 
Griswold, the Court stated that the right of privacy is found in the penumbras of the 
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of the Constitution. Id. at 484. 
Justice Goldberg concurred in the Griswold decision, but found the right of privacy 
to exist in the ninth amendment. In his opinion, the ninth amendment was included 
to indicate that the first eight amendments were not an exhaustive list of the individ­
ual rights reserved to the citizens. Id. at 488. The approaches taken by previous 
courts in identifying the sources of the right of privacy were not rejected by the 
Court in Roe v. Wade. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, however, ex­
pressed his preference for the view that the privacy right was founded in the four­
teenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action. This 
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penumbras are the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage re­
lationship and the attendant right of the married couple to use con­
traceptives free from governmental intrusion. 13 In 1972, the Court 
found in Eisenstadt v. Baird14 that the right of privacy means "the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from un­
warranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af­
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child. "15 
In 1973, the Court decided Roe v. Wade 16 in which it held 
that the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty en­
compassed the woman's privacy right to decide whether to termi­
nate her pregnancy.17 The Court held unconstitutional part of the 
Texas Penal Code that made it a crime to procure an abortion ex­
cept when necessary for the purpose of saving the mother's life. 18 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that a 
woman's decision whether to have an abortion is protected from in­
terference by the state except in cases in which the state has a 
compelling interest in safeguarding maternal health, maintaining 
medical standards, or protecting potential life. 19 The Court estab­
lished that these state interests became more substantial as the 
woman approached term, and at some point during pregnancy 
these interests became compelling. 20 
right includes elements of personal autonomy, and is broad enough to encompass the 
woman's decision to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
13. 381 V.S. at 485-86. 
14. 405 V.S. 438 (1972). 
15. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). For an examination of the two competing 
grounds of the privacy right as articulated in Griswold and Eisenstadt, see, Eich­
baum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the 
Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 361 (1979) (the privacy 
right is grounded in notions of individual autonomy rather than in the conventional 
interests of marriage and the family). 
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
17. Id. at 153. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "Deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
18. The Texas criminal abortion legislation that was struck down by the Court 
made it a crime to procure an abortion or to attempt one, except with respect to an 
abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life 
of the mother. 410 V.S. at 117 n.1. 
19. Id. at 154. 
20. (a) For the stage prior to approximately tl)e end of the first trimester, 
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judg­
ment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. 
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, 
the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it 
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In the absence of compelling state interests, the authority of 
a state to regulate or interefere with abortions is strictly circum­
scribed. Thus, in Doe v. Bolton,21 the Court held that procedural 
requirements that the abortion be approved by a hospital com­
mittee and two other physicians were unduly restrictive of a wom­
an's rights and needs in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 22 
The Court reasoned that the requirements burdened the woman's 
abortion decision without promoting any compelling state interest. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,23 the Court struck down pa­
rental and spousal consent requirements that gave third parties an 
absolute veto power over the abortion decision. The Court held 
that since the state cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during 
the first trimester of pregnancy, it cannot delegate authority to any 
person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same 
period. 24 
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related 
to maternal health. 
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest 
in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro­
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg­
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 
ld. at 164-65. 
21. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
22. ld. at 198-99. The Court also struck down both the hospital accreditation re­
quirement on the basis that it was not rationally related to the state's interest in 
preserving the mother's health, and the residence requirement because it violated 
the privileges and immunities clause by denying protection to persons who enter 
Georgia for medical services there. ld. at 200. See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
23. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
24. ld. at 69, 74. The Court recognized, however, that the constitutional rights 
of minors and adults are not identical. The state has broader authority to regulate the 
activities of minors, whether it be for the purpose of assuring the minor's welfare, or 
to safeguard the family unit and parental authority. The Court, therefore, emphasized 
that their decision did not suggest that every minor can give effective consent for an 
abortion. The age and maturity of the child must be considered. ld. at 74-75. 
Subsequent to Danforth, the Court has had occasion to speak further on the is­
sue of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision. In Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. 
Ct. 3035 (1979), a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent before an abor­
tion could be performed on an unmarried minor was struck down. The statute pro­
vided that the abortion could be authorized by the court for good cause shown, 
notwithstanding the absence of parental consent. Parents would, however, be given 
notice of the judicial proceedings brought by the minor to circumvent their consent. 
ld. at 3039 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1977)). 
Justice Powell, writing a plurality decision for the Court, held that a parental 
consent requirement was valid if the minor was entitled as an alternative to go di­
rectly to the court for authorization without prior parental notification. ld. at 3051. 
Should the court determine that the minor is mature enough to make a fully in­
formed abortion decision, or that the abortion is in her best interests, then the court 
must authorize the abortion. ld. at 3052. 
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Early abortion decisions were interpreted by the lower courts 
to secure substantial rights for indigent women. 25 Several cases 
held that a state's Medicaid program could not deny funding for 
nontherapeutic abortions as long as it funded childbirth. 26 Wolfe v . 
. Schroering27 held that a public hospital could not refuse to perform 
abortions based on ethical objections. Whatever rights were se­
cured for indigent women in these cases, however, were short­
lived. In the abortion funding cases of Beal v. Doe,28 Maher v. 
Roe,29 and Poelker v. Doe,30 the Supreme Court reversed the 
trend appearing in the lower courts and set limits on the right of 
privacy articulated in Roe. 
In Beal31 and Maher,32 the Court held that states were nei­
ther statutorily nor constitutionally required to fund non thera­
peutic abortions under their Medicaid programs. The Court held in 
Poelker33 that a city may choose to provide publicly funded hospi­
tal services for childbirth without providing corresponding services 
for elective abortions. The Court realized that without state fund­
ing many indigents would have difficulty financing non therapeutic 
abortions. That difficulty, however, was not deemed unduly bur­
densome on the constitutional right to decide to terminate preg­
nancy, and therefore, the regulations were not subject to the 
compelling state interest test. The Court reasoned that regulations 
limiting funding did not place any obstacles in a woman's path to 
an abortion that were not already there by virtue of her indigency. 
A woman was still free to procure an abortion using private 
funds. 34 The Court then determined that the regulations were per­
missible because they were rationally related to the state's legiti­
mate interest in encouraging childbirth. 35 
25. Regulations that treat abortions differently from similar medical procedures 
are held unconstitutionally to interfere with a woman's right of privacy. See, e.g., 
Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Cannon, 463 F. Supp. 531 (D.R.1. 
1978); Mobile Women's Medical Clinic v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. 
Ala. 1977). 
26. See, e.g., Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), appeal 
dismissed, cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitz­
patrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. Pa. 1975). 
27. 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976). 
28. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
29. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
30. 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
31. Seal v. Doe, id. at 445. 
32. Maher v. Roe, id. at 474. 
33. Poelker v. Doe, id. at 521. 
34. ld. at 474. 
35. ld. at 478. But see id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan 
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In Maher, the Court stated that its decision signaled no re­
treat from Roe or the cases applying it. 36 The point stressed by the 
Court was merely that Roe did not declare an unqualified right to 
an abortion. 37 There are two sides to the abortion privacy right. It 
is impermissible for the state to create obstacles that interfere with 
the abortion decision; the state, however, is not obligated to take 
affirmative action in making abortion services available to the 
poor. 3S 
III. COURT'S OPINION 
The Minnesota court's analysis of the constitutional rights of 
Medicaid patients was primarily a response to the arguments set 
forth by the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (M.C.L. U.) as amicus 
curiae. 39 The M. C. L. U. argued that disclosure would unconsti­
tutionally interfere with the patients' privacy rights on several 
grounds. First, the patients' names might be accidentally disclosed, 
causing patients to refrain from obtaining necessary abortions for 
fear of such disclosure. Patients also might fear that disclosure 
would enable others to infer their reasons correctly for seeing a 
objected to the majority's conclusion that Roe established a state interest in encour­
aging childbirth that runs throughout pregnancy. The state's interest in the potential 
life of the fetus was declared in Roe not to begin until approximately the third tri­
mester. 410 U.S. at 163. 
36. 432 U.S. at 475. 
37. ld. at 473. 
38. A further setback for indigent women seeking abortions came in 1976 with 
the passage of Fiscal Year 1979 Labor-HEW Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-480, 
§ 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978) (Hyde Amendment). The Act prohibits the use of federal 
funds for abortions unless necessary to save the mother's life or to prevent severe 
and long lasting damage to the mother's health. ld. In July, 1979, three cases were 
filed with the Supreme Court for determination of whether' the Hyde Amendment vi­
olates the equal protection clause by treating medically necessary abortions differ­
ently from other medically necessary surgical procedures. The Court is also pre­
sented with the question of whether the act substantively amends title XIX so as to 
allow a state to withdraw funding under its Medicaid program for medically neces­
sary abortions that title XIX would otherwise require it to provide. Zbaraz v. Quem, 
596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.w. 3013 (July 13, 1979) 
(No. 79-64); Williams v. Zbaraz, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979), juris. postponed 
pending hearing on merits, 100 S. Ct. 447 (1979) (No. 79-4). 
39. The appellants asserted that collection and disclosure of data relating to 
abortions is constitutionally suspect, and may be sustained only upon a showing that 
it will be held in confidence and that it will not restrict the physician's right to exer­
cise his medical judgment or otherwise interfere with a pregnant woman's right to 
obtain an abortion prior to viability of the embryo. 274 N.W.2d at 90. The court re­
jected this argument as overly broad and as not correctly stating the Supreme Court's 
holding in Danforth. ld. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52). 
The court added that "[t]he amicus brief of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union 
provides a better statement of the constitutional issues." 274 N.W.2d at 90. 
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named doctor. Finally, because disclosure might convince some 
doctors to discontinue performing Medicaid 'abortions, 40 indigent 
women might find it more difficult to obtain an abortion under the 
state's medical assistance program. 41 
The court's dismissal of these arguments was based primarily 
on the lack of substantiating evidence. It reasoned that the possi­
bility of accidental disclosure of confidential information should not 
be sufficient to deprive the public of access to other information of 
a public nature,42 and that there was no evidence that the Depart­
ment of Welfare's recording procedures were insufficient to protect 
patient anonymity. There was also no evidence before the court 
that the possibility of accidental disclosure would be a significant 
factor in a patient's decision not to seek an abortion. 43 
The court found even less reasonable the argument that a 
woman might be deterred from seeking an abortion from a named 
provider because others might infer her reason for seeing the doc­
tor. The court contended that for such an assumption to have 
merit, the doctor would have to provide almost no services except 
abortions. In that case, the nature of his practice would probably 
be known to the public anyway, even without disclosure. 44 
The court had more difficulty with the possibility of a radical 
reduction in the number of abortion providers. The court deter­
mined, however, that the evidence did not support speculations 
that such a reduction would result from disclosure. 45 Nevertheless, 
40. See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text. 
41. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 14-15. 
42. 274 N.W.2d at 91. The court cited Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), 
which held that the possibility of accidental disclosure is not sufficient to preclude 
the state from acquiring confidential information. 
43. 274 N.W.2d at 91. 
44. Id. at 91-92. 
45. Regarding the testimony, the court stated: 
Robert C. Randle, director of the Medical assistance division of the state 
Medicaid program, states in his deposition that disclosure of physicians' 
names "could have some kind of an impact on participation" of medical pro­
viders in the medical assistance program. He goes on to state, however, that 
his "primary concern was the relationship between the providers and the 
program." Nowhere does he forecast a "radical restriction" in the number of 
participating providers. 
The affidavit of plaintiff Dr. Chester Anderson states that disclosure of 
the names of physicians and the nature of the treatments they provided 
"would also discourage physicians and other medical providers from pro­
viding treatment covered by the Medical Assistance program to patients el­
igible for Medical Assistance and discourage physicians and other medical 
providers from performing necessary medical procedures which are contro­
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in its analysis, the court recognized that disclosure would permit 
the public to pressure doctors to cease providing abortion serv­
ices. 46 These two seemingly contradictory findings were reconciled 
by distinguishing between private action and state action. The 
court did not deny that disclosure by a state agency of that agen­
cy's records was state action. It found, however, that disclosure, 
standing alone, would place no burden on the doctor. It would not 
destroy the confidentiality of his relationship with his patients, and 
it would not restrict his freedom to exercise his medical judg­
ment. 47 The court stated that public pressure aimed at convincing 
a doctor to stop performing abortions constituted private, not state, 
action and consequently, would be of no constitutional signifi­
cance. 48 The court did not consider, however, that without state 
disclosure there could be no private action. 
The M. C. L. U. next argued that disclosure would deprive a 
physician of his right to practice medicine according to his best 
judgment, and without undue interference by the state. 49 Two in­
terests are involved here. One is the physician's interest in per­
sonal autonomy and self-determination as to which medical services 
to provide. The other is his interest in earning a livelihood free 
from boycotts, pickets, and other threats to his professional oppor­
tunities. 5o Chief Justice Sheran rejected this argument stating that 
it is unclear whether a physician has his own right to practice med­
icine, or whether that right is merely derivative from the privacy 
rights of the patient. 51 The court added that even should such a 
versial from a nonmedical point of view." He does not allege any significant 
reduction in the number of doctors willing to participate in the medical as­
sistance program. Neither Randle nor Anderson offers any support for his 
speculations. 
Id. at 92. 
46. ld. 
47. ld. 
48. ld. at 92-93. 
49. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 28. 
50. ld. at 28-29. 
51. In Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), the court 
stated that Roe had "clearly paved the way for physicians to assert their constitu­
tional rights to practice medicine, which now includes the right to advise and per­
form abortions," but that such claims were inextricably bound up with the privacy 
rights of women who seek abortions. ld. at 1344. In Minnesota Medical, however, 
the court relied on Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), where the Supreme 
Court stated that it had no occasion in that case to decide whether doctors had their 
own constitutional right to practice medicine as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit had maintained. Id. at 113. 
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right exist, disclosure in and of itself does not constitute interfer­
ence by the state. 52 
The court rejected the asserted privacy right of the doctors to 
keep the details of their professional and business dealings from 
being made public. The court reasoned that the constitutional right 
of privacy includes only personal rights of a fundamental nature 
and that records of services paid for with public funds cannot be 
characterized as purely personal or extremely private. 53 Disclosure, 
therefore, would not infringe any fundamental rights of the doc­
tors, and was, in fact, proper when balanced against the public's 
need for information about th~ workings of government. 54 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The constitutional right of privacy is a relatively new and rap­
idly developing area of law. 55 Although Roe established that the 
52. 274 N.W.2d at 93. 
53. ld. at 94 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152). 
54. 274 N.W.2d at 93-94. 
55. The privacy tort was suggested in 1890 by a law review article. Warren & 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The right to privacy was 
not judicially established as a constitutional right, however, until 1965. Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Since that time cases have expanded the concept 
of constitutional privacy, but no concise definition of the right has been formulated. 
See Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587 (1977); Eichbaum, supra note 
15; Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. 
REV. 329 (1979); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233 (1977). 
As the ability to collect, store, and disseminate large quantities of personal infor­
mation has increased with the widespread use of computers, the need for a well de­
fined concept of privacy has become more pressing. Judge Gesell's opinion in 
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), although dealing with the 
dissemination of criminal records, includes a strong warning applicable to all aspects 
of the right of privacy: 
The increasing complexity of our society and technological advances which 
facilitate massive accumulation and ready regurgitation of far-flung data have 
presented more problems in this area, certainly problems not contemplated 
by the framers of the Constitution. These developments emphasize a press­
ing need to preserve and to redefine aspects of the right of privacy to insure 
the basic freedoms guaranteed by this democracy. 
A heavy burden is placed on all branches of Government to maintain a 
proper equilibrium between the acquisition of information and the necessity 
to safeguard privacy. Systematic recordation and dissemination of informa­
tion about individual citizens is a form of surveillance and control which 
may easily inhibit freedom to speak, to work, and to move about in this land. 
If information available to Government is misused to publicize past inci­
dents in the lives of its citizens the pressures for conformity will be irresist­
ible. Initiative and individuality can be suffocated and a resulting dullness 
of mind and conduct will become the norm. 
328 F. Supp. at 725-26 (footnote omitted). 
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right to decide to have an abortion is within the privacy sphere, it 
is still unclear what actions amount to an unconstitutional interfer­
ence with that right. Minnesota Medical represents a move toward 
limiting the protection that will be accorded privacy rights through 
its underlying distinction between direct and indirect interferences 
with the abortion decision. 
The Minnesota court took a very narrow approach in its analy­
sis of the effects of disclosure. It looked at who might interfere 
with the doctors' practices rather than who made such interference 
possible. The court looked at who might be attacked, rather than 
who might suffer. The inevitable conclusion reached from this anal­
ysis was that the only potentially adverse consequences of disclo­
sure would be private harassment of abortion providers, a matter of 
no constitutional significance. 
This reasoning ignores the causal chain of events initiated by 
disclosure. A more realistic analysis would show that the state is 
responsible for interfering with Medicaid patients' constitutional 
right of privacy by disseminating sensitive information that can be 
used by the public to cause a reduction in the number of abortion 
providers. Although the interference is a few steps removed from 
the state action of disclosure, it is, nonetheless, equally as burden­
some on the abortion decision as direct state interferences would 
be. To ignore the indirect effects of state action in the privacy 
sphere is to undermine the right of privacy before it has had a 
chance to develop fully. 
A. Interference 
The legitimacy of a state's authority to require recording and 
reporting to the health department of certain doctor-patient trans­
actions has been firmly established by two United States Supreme 
Court cases. In Danforth,56 the Court upheld the validity of a 
Missouri statute requiring reports of all abortions. The statute had 
been challenged on the basis that it imposed an extra layer and 
burden of regulation on the abortion decision and unconstitution­
ally applied to all stages of pregnancy. The Court was sympathetic 
to the appellants' argument that during the first trimester of preg­
nancy the state should not be able to impose any record keeping 
requirements that Significantly differ from those imposed with re­
spect to other comparable medical or surgical procedures. 57 The 
56. 428 U.S. at 52. 
57. The Court held that during the first stage of pregnancy the state may 
impose no regulations governing the physician's determination that, in his medical 
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Court was also sympathetic, however, to the state's argument that 
record keeping of this kind can be useful to the state's interest 
in protecting the health of its female citizens. In balancing the 
competing interests, the Court noted the statute's stringent provi­
sions safeguarding the confidentiality of the patients' names and 
concluded that the statute posed no legally significant impact or 
consequence on the abortion decision or on the doctor-patient rela­
tion. 58 
The constitutionality of reporting requirements in areas of 
health care was reaffirmed by the Court in Whalen v. Roe. 59 In 
that case, a New York statute requiring the identification of users 
and dispensers of schedule II drugs60 was challenged on the basis 
that such records infringed on the patient's interest in nondis­
closure of private information. The Court concluded, however, that 
the security provisions of the statute evidenced a proper concern 
with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy.61 The 
Court recognized the possibility that some patients would forego 
needed medication because of the fear of accidental disclosure of 
their names. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the threat 
was not sufficiently grievous to constitute an invasion of the pa­
tients' privacy interests. 62 
Whalen 63 addresses two kinds of interests that underlie the 
constitutional right of privacy. One is the individual's interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the other is the inter­
est in making certain fundamental decisions independently.64 The 
Minnesota reporting requirements apparently satisfy the demands 
set down in Danforth and Whalen regarding the first privacy inter-
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. Id. at 80 (citing Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64). 
58. The Court stated that the requirements for confidentiality, with the sole ex­
ception for public health officers, and retention of records for a maximum of seven 
years kept the statute within constitutional limits. 428 U.S. at 81. The Court cau­
tioned, however, that the statute should not be used to unconstitutionally restrict the 
abortion decision through the sheer burden of record keeping detail. Id. 
59. 429 U.S. 589 (1976). 
60. Schedule II drugs include the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs, such 
as opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and meth­
aqualone. Id. at 593 n.8. The statute required identification of the prescribing physi­
cian, the dispensing pharmacy, the drug and dosage and the name, address and age 
of the patient. Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-3354 (McKinney Cum. 
Supp. 1976-77)). 
61. 429 U.S. at 605. 
62. Id. at 603-04. 
63. Id. at 589. 
64. Id. at 599-600. 
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est of confidentiality. The state's interest in abortion records for 
statistical purposes and for use in furtherance of maternal health is 
clearly valid. 65 The records are also necessary in order to enable 
the state to pay the physicians and to investigate the propriety of 
such payments. 66 Furthermore, no disclosure of the patients' 
names is likely since the computer tapes enable the retrieval of 
only specified information. 67 
It is the other privacy interest articulated by the Whalen 
Court, the interest in independence in making fundamental deci­
sions, that is most seriously threatened by disclosure of the names 
of abortion providers. In Whalen, the patient's decision to use 
schedule II drugs would not be impaired because disclosure of the 
sensitive records was merely speculative in view of the statute's 
limited access provisions. 68 In Minnesota, the patient's abortion 
decision is not similarly protected. Disclosure of the names of abor­
tion providers constitutes disclosure of sensitive information which 
may have an adverse impact on the patients' privacy rights. 
65. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 438 U.S. at 80. 
66. The Minnesota medical assistance statute provides: 

Subdivision 1. In the interests of efficient administration of the medical as­

sistance to the needy program and incident to the approval of rates and char­

ges therefor, the commissioner of public welfare may require any reports, in­

formation, and audits of medical vendors which he deems necessary. 

Subd. 3. The commissioner of public welfare, with the written consent of 
the recipient, shall be allowed access to all medical records of medical as­
sistance recipients solely for the purpose of investigating whether or not: (a) 
a vendor of medical care actually provided the medical care for which a 
claim for reimbursement was made; or (b) the medical care was medically 
necessary. 
Subd. 5. Medical records obtained by the commissioner of public welfare 
pursuant to this section are private data, as ,defined in section 15.162, subdi­
vision Sa. 
MINN. STAT. § 256B.27 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
67. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union argued that disclosure of patients' 
names was a legitimate fear in view of the "state's willingness to grant access to its 
computers to non-employees and to assist in the preparation of programs by which 
persons other than state officials may gain access to information in the state's com­
puters." Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 15-16. The court 
determined, however, that the state's safeguards against such disclosure were ade­
quate. 274 N.W.2d at 86 n.1. 
68. 429 U.S. at 600. The Court acknowledged that some people had been dis­
couraged from using schedule II drugs because of their concern that the information 
might be disclosed. On the other hand, the Court was presented with evidence that 
prior to the district court's enjoining the enforcement of the statute, 100,000 prescrip­
tions for schedule II drugs had been filled each month. The Court concluded, there­
fore, that the statute did not deprive the public of access to the drugs. Id. at 602-03. 
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Although disclosure of doctors' names, on its face, may not ap­
pear to interfere with a woman's right to make an independent 
abortion decision, this does not conclusively detennine whether, in 
fact, any interference will result. The practical impact of disclosure 
on the doctors, and in turn on their patients, cannot be ignored. 
Given the intensity of public feelings on the abortion issue and the 
abuse experienced by abortion clinics which are openly operated, 69 
many doctors may cease providing abortions to Medicaid patients 
in order to escape retaliation from the public. Should such a reduc­
tion occur, the indigent woman's access to an abortion would be 
greatly restricted. 
A reduction in the number of doctors willing to perfonn abor­
tions is not as speculative as the court maintains. 7o The Medicaid 
program is presently encountering difficulties due to the reluctance 
of doctors to participate in the program even in the area of routine 
medical care.71 If participation also entails exposing oneself to the 
rash of public hostilities aimed at abortion providers,72 the likeli­
hood that many doctors will refuse to perform abortions under the 
medical assistance program is even greater. 
The impact of a reduction in Medicaid abortion providers is 
that indigent women will find it even more difficult to tenninate 
unwanted, and possibly life-endangering, pregnancies. Abortions, 
69. See note 82 infra. 
70. 274 N.W.2d at 92. 
71. Butler, The Medicaid Program; Current Statutory Requirements and Judi­
cial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7, 14-15 (1974). 
[B]urdensome bureaucratic requirements, such as receiving authorization 
before performing services, complex billing procedures, slow payment, low 
fee schedules, and frequent changes in program services and procedures, 
have turned many physicians away from the Medicaid program. Probably 
the greatest single problem facing the Medicaid recipient ... is the inac­
cessibility and unavailability of Medicaid providers, particularly physicians. 
Id. at 14. See also Law, Reproductive Freedom in Legal Services Practice, 12 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 389, 397 (1978); Note, The Effects of Present Medicaid Deci­
sions on a Constitutional Right: Abortions Only for the Rich? 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
687,704 (1978). 
72. The most recent attacks on abortion rights, according to the Women's 
Rights Clinic of Antioch School of Law, have taken place not in the courts or the leg­
islature, but in the abortion clinics themselves. A 1978 study by the Women's Rights 
Clinic describes the variety of tactics that have been used to disrupt abortion clinics 
in areas as diverse as Anchorage, Omaha, and Cincinnati. Burnings and firebombings 
were reported in eight clinics since May, 1977. Other damage was caused by vandals 
and trespassers. Patients have been intimidated in waiting rooms, and picketers have 
recorded the license plate numbers of patients and staff members at these clinics. In 
Minnesota, two children of clinic board members required protection because of 
anonymous personal threats. [1978] 4 ABORTION L. REP. (Women's Rights Clinic, 
Antioch School of Law) 20.1 to .2 (Anti-Choice Activity). 
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even when paid for by private funds, are often hard to procure. In 
1977, nearly 500,000 women had to travel considerable distances, 
and often out of state, for abortions. Approximately 600,000 women 
who wanted abortions were unable to obtain them at all. 73 One of 
the reasons for this inaccessibility is the concentration of abortion 
facilities in relatively few urban centers in each state. 74 Another 
contributing factor is the relatively small number of public hospi­
tals that are willing to perform abortions. 75 In Minnesota, the di­
mensions of the problem are illustrated by evidence that outside 
the state's major metropolitan areas, abortions were performed by 
only five major providers. 76 Any reduction in the number of pro­
viders in that area would seriously curtail the availability of abor­
tion services. 
For indigent women,77 the burden is even more pronounced. 
In 1977, women eligible for Medicaid constituted nearly one-fourth 
of the women estimated to have been unable to obtain the abor­
tions they wanted during the year, even though they represented 
less than one-tenth of the women of reproductive age. 78 This pro­
portional difference is attributable in part to the indigent woman's 
lack of familiarity with the medical system which prevents her from 
being able to locate an abortion provider. In addition, she may not 
be able to afford to leave her job or her family if the nearest abor­
73. ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, ABORTIONS AND THE POOR: PRIVATE Mo­
RALITY, PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1979). 
74. ld. at 13. 
75. Indigents have traditionally relied on public hospitals for medical care. In 
1976, however, only 21% of the nation's 2,060 public hospitals performed any abor­
tions at all. Id. at 16. Public hospitals attended to 26% of all births, but provided 
only 8% of all abortions. Id. 
76. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 22-23 n.4. 
77. Medicaid patients are by definition poor. Title XIX provides: 
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the con­
ditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families 
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose 
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical 
services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and 
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care, there is 
hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to 
carry out the purposes of this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). 
The Minnesota medical assistance statute provides: "Medical assistance for 
needy persons whose resources are not adequate to meet the cost of such care is 
hereby declared to be a matter of state concern. To provide such care, a statewide 
program of medical assistance, with free choice of vendor, is hereby established." 
MINN. STAT. § 256B.Ol (1971). 
78. See note 73 supra at 13. 
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tion provider is in a distant city. 79 
The Minnesota Medicaid program funds only those abortions 
that are necessary to prevent the death of the mother, or those in 
which the pregnancy is the result of criminal sexual conduct or in­
cest. 80 In the case of medically necessary abortions, the inability to 
obtain an abortion may severely threaten the mother's life. Even in 
the case of abortions that are not medically necessary, with every 
week of delay in finding a doctor who will perform the abortion 
there is a twenty percent increase in the risk of complication and a 
fifty percent increase in the mortality rate when the abortion is 
finally obtained. 81 
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that disclosure would 
not result in a deprivation of Medicaid patients' rights to privacy in 
making an independent abortion decision. 82 "Deprivation," how­
ever, is not the test of unconstitutionality set forth in previous 
cases. Any state action that unduly interferes with the abortion de­
cision, not merely those that totally deprive a woman of her ability 
to make an independent abortion decision, are unconstitutional. 83 
An inability to find a doctor willing to perform an abortion is just 
as burdensome as requiring that the abortion be approved by a . 
hospital committee,84 or subject to the confirmation of two other 
doctors,85 the spouse,86 or the parent.87 All of these have been 
ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court as un­
due interferences with the right of privacy in the absence of any 
compelling state interest. 
79. Id. at 5. 
80. The Minnesota medical assistance statute provides: 

"Medical assistance" or "medical care" means payment of part or all of the 

cost of the following care and services for eligible individuals whose income 

and resources are insufficient to meet all of such cost: 

(13) Abortion services, but only if one of the following conditions is met: 

(a) The abortion is a medical necessity .... 

(b) The pregnancy is the result of criminal sexual conduct .... 
(c) The pregnancy is the result of incest .... 
MINN. STAT. § 256B.02(8) (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
81. See note 73 supra at 31. 
82. 274 N.W.2d at 93. 
83. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473 ("a state-created obstacle need not 
be absolute to be impermissible ...."); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 
52 (struck down spousal and parental consent requirements that unduly burden the 
right to seek an abortion); Doe v. Bolton, '410 U.S. at 179 (struck down procedural re­
quirements that unduly restricted or infringed upon the patient's right of privacy). 
84. 410 U.s. at 198. 
85. ld. at 199. 
86. 428 U.s. at 71. 
87. ld. at 75. See also note 24 supra. 
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The Minnesota court avoided subjecting the issue of disclosure 
to the compelling state interest test. It reasoned that the state was 
not responsible for any reduction in the number of abortion provid­
ers which might interfere with a woman's constitutionally protected 
abortion decision. The court held that a doctor's decision to stop 
performing abortions would be caused by public hostility rather 
than state action, and that therefore, constitutional restraints did 
not apply.88 As Justice James C. Otis reminded the court in his 
dissent, however, without state action there can be no disclosure, 
and without disclosure there will be no private action. 89 The state 
cannot deny its role in enabling the public to deny Medicaid pa­
tients of their fundamental rights. 
The Supreme Court has held that where the state gives the 
public the means of denying citizens rights guaranteed to them un­
der the United States Constitution, the state will be held account­
able. 90 This rule grows out of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution which secures all persons against any 
state action which results in deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. 91 In Shelley v. Kraemer,92 the Court 
defined state action as the exertion of state power in all forms. It 
concluded, therefore, that judicial enforcement of private agree­
ments excluding blacks from buying real estate constituted state ac­
tion in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Judicial enforce­
ment of private restaurants' policies of excluding blacks was also 
found to constitute state action in Bell v. Maryland. 93 
In NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson,94 the Court reversed 
a judgment of civil contempt entered against the National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for refusing 
to comply with a court order requiring the production of member­
88. This theme runs throughout the majority opinion. 

Of course, disclosure may also permit those who oppose abortions to focus 

pressure on the named doctors to convince them that it would be in their 

best interests to cease providing the service. The propriety of such action, 

however, is not before this court, which is concerned ... only with the ef­

fect of the disclosure itself. 

274 N.W.2d at 92. "If antiabortion factions of the public convince him [the physi­
cian] to stop performing abortions, his decision will be the result of private, not 
state, actions .... [D}isclosure itself does not constitute 'interference' by the state." 
[d. at 92-93. 
89. Id. at 97 (Otis, J., dissenting). 
90. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text. 
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
92. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). 
93. 378 U.S. 226, 259 (1964). 
94. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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ship list. The Court held that the lower court's production order 
constituted state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment 
because it provided the public with the means of denying citizens 
their constitutional right of association. 95 In making its determina­
tion, the Court looked to previous acts of public hostility that had 
followed from revelation of the identity of NAACP members and 
concluded that the compelled disclosure of its Alabama member­
ship list might induce members to withdraw, or dissuade others 
from joining. That such acts of hostility would follow from private 
community pressures rather than from direct state measures did 
not discourage the Court from a finding of state action. "The cru­
cial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it 
is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the 
production order that private action takes hold. "96 
The Minnesota court's determination that a doctor's decision 
to stop performing abortions due to public pressure would not be 
the result of state action97 is untenable in light of Shelley, Bell, and 
NAACP. It is only after the initial exertion of state power repre­
sented by disclosure that private action in the form of hostility to­
wards abortion providers can take hold. Past experience indicates 
that acts of public hostility are likely to follow upon disclosure, 98 
and any resulting reduction in the number of Medicaid abortion 
providers will seriously interfere with the patients' abortion deci­
sions. The state cannot deny its role in this deprivation of constitu­
tional rights. 
B. The Doctor-Patient Relation 
A major consideration in the court's decision to allow disclo­
sure was the public's interest in knowing about the workings of 
government. The court held that the public's right of access to re­
cords of official business outweighed the doctors' asserted rights 
not to have all their professional and business dealings made pub­
lic. 99 Crucial to the court's determination was its finding that dis­
closure did not infringe on any fundamental privacy right of the 
doctors.1oo Inevitably, when the public's important right of infor­
mation is balanced against the doctors' limited privacy interests, the 
95. Id. at 462. 
96. Id. at 463. 
97. 274 N.W.2d at 92. 
98. See note 72 supra. 
99. 274 N.W.2d at 93-94. 
100. Id. at 94. 
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argument against disclosure loses much of its force. This balanc­
ing test, however, was flawed by the court's failure to consider the 
effect of disclosure on the patients' fundamental right of privacy. 
By excluding the patients from the analysis of the competing 
interests at stake, the court was able to compare this case to pre­
vious cases which allowed publication of state held information 
when no fundamental rights were threatened by disclosure. The 
Minnesota court primarily relied on two United States Supreme 
Court decisions, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 101 and Paul v. 
Davis .102 Major discrepancies between the facts in Cox and Paul 
and the facts in Minnesota Medical,103 however, undermine their 
value as authority for the Minnesota decision. 
Cox held unconstitutional a Georgia law prohibiting the publi­
cation of the names of rape victims on the ground that the informa­
tion was contained in official court records open to public in spec­
tion. 104 In Minnesota Medical, however, the publication of public 
data was not the issue. The issue was whether the data in question 
was public at all. Cox is not authority for the contention that all of­
ficial records are public records. In fact, the Court was careful to 
explain that its decision did not imply anything about the constitu­
tional questions which might arise from a state policy of restricting 
public access to various kinds of official records. 105 The Court was 
not compelled, however, to distinguish between public and non­
public official records because there was no contention in Cox that 
the court records were not open to public inspection. lOS The 
Minnesota court's reliance on Cox for the proposition that the pub­
lic has a right to the records of medical payments because they are 
records of official activities is, therefore, misplaced. 
In Paul, the Court held that an individual whose arrest record 
was distributed to merchants by the police department had no con­
stitutional claim to an invasion of privacy. 107 The Court stated that 
the personal rights found in the fourteenth amendment's guarantee 
of personal privacy are limited to those which are " 'fundamental' 
or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "108 Included in this 
definition are matters relating to marriage, procreation, contracep­
101. 420 U.S. 46H (1975). 
102. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
103. 274 N.W.2d at 84. 
104. 420 U.S. at 492. 
105. Id. at 496 n.26. 
106. Id. at 496. 
107. 424 U.S. at 713. 
108. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
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tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In these 
areas there are limitations on a state's power to regulate conduct 
substantively. The Court held that an official act such as an arrest, 
however, does not fall within the privacy sphere, and consequently 
it is not subject to the same constitutional protection. 109 
The Minnesota court determined that under Paul, disclosure 
of the names of Medicaid abortion providers did not violate the 
doctors' rights of privacy because all that was involved was disclo­
sure of records of official acts. 110 The disclosure of arrest records in 
Paul, however, did not involve an interference with a fundamental 
right of the plaintiff. The decision in that case should not, there­
fore, be dispositive of the issues in the present case. The patients' 
interests affected by disclosure of doctors' names are precisely 
within the area of matters of an intimate nature identified by the 
Paul Court where there are limitations on a state's power to regu­
late conduct substantively.111 Interference with the fundamental 
rights of patients cannot be overlooked simply by posing the ques­
tion in terms of doctors' rights. The interests of the doctors and 
their patients must be viewed together due to the special relation­
ship between the doctor and the patient in the abortion deci­
sion. 112 
109. The Court stated that respondent's claim was not based on any recognized 
privacy claim, and that the Court would not enlarge the constitutional right of pri­
vacy to include his claim that the state may not publicize records of official acts such 
as an arrest. 424 U.S. at 713. 
1l0. 274 N.W.2d at 94. 
llI. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: 
In Roe the Court pointed out that the personal rights found in this guarantee 
of personal privacy must be limited to those which are "fundamental" or 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" as described in Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288, 292 (1937). 
The activities detailed as being within this definition were ones very differ­
ent from that for which respondent claims constitutional protection-matters 
relating to marriage, 'procreation, contraception, family relationships, and 
child rearing and education. In these areas it has been held that there are 
limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct. 
424 U.S. at 713. 
112. The Minnesota court itself recognized the unique nature of the doctor­
patient relationship by granting the doctors standing to assert their patients' rights. 
274 N.W.2d at 87 n.2. On the standing issue, the court relied on Singleton v. Wulff, 
428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976), which held that it is generally appropriate for a physician 
to assert the rights of women patients in an action against state interference with the 
abortion decision. The basis for the Singleton exception, to the general rule prohib­
iting resolution of controversies on the basis of the rights of third personS" not parties 
to the litigation, was the Court's finding of an intimate relationship between the doc­
tor and the abortion patient. Id. at 117. Implicit in the Minnesota court's decision to 
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When a state intrudes on a fundamental right, it is limited by 
the need to show a compelling state interest for its interference 
and it must effectuate that interest through means narrowly drawn 
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake,113 The 
competing state interest involved in Minnesota Medical is the in­
terest in allowing the public access to information about the work­
ings of government. 114 As Cox held, the public needs information 
about the operation of the government in order to have an intelli­
gent voice in governmental affairs,U5 It is essential that the public 
have access to information on the number of state funded abortions 
and the amount of government funds dedicated to such services, 
Only with this information in hand can the public be effective in its 
attempts to limit or expand such services through demonstrations, 
allow the doctors standing to assert their patients' rights, then, is the recognition that 
the doctors' and patients' interests are closely intertwined. 
It is not only in the area of standing that the link between doctors and patients 
has been identified. The importance of this relationship in the abortion decision is a 
theme that can be found running throughout the abortion cases, beginning with Roe. 
In that decision, the Court stated that during the first trimester, the abortion decision 
and its effectuation were matters to be left to the judgment of the attending physi­
cian in consultation with the patient. 410 U.S. at 163. In Bolton, the Court observed 
the importance of allowing the attending physician the discretion necessary to make 
the best medical judgment for the benefit of the pregnant woman. Id. at 192. In 
Whalen, the Court construed Bolton to mean that obstacles in the path of a doctor, 
which had a significant impact on a woman's freedom to make a constitutionally pro­
tected decision, violated the Constitution. 429 U.S. at 605 n.33. In 1979, the Court 
again emphasized the central role of the physician in the abortion decision in 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979). The suggestion in all of these cases is 
that interferences with a physician's ability to perform abortions may violate the pa­
tient's constitutional rights as well. 
113. In Griswold, the Court cautioned that "a governmental purpose to control 
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved 
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro­
tected freedoms." 381 U.S. at 485. In Roe, the Court restated: "Where certain 'funda­
mental rights' are involved, ... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only 
by a 'compelling state interest,' ... and legislative enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake:~ 410 U.S. at 155. 
114. 274 N.W.2d at 93. - .­
115. [Iln a society in which each individual has but limited time and re­
sources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his govern­
ment, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient 
form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed 
upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of gov­
ernment, and official records and documents open to the public are the basic 
data of governmental operations. Without the information provided by the 
press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote 
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government 
generally. 
420 U.S. at 491-92. 
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lobbying, or requests to their representatives. This need for infor­
mation, however, must be effectuated in a manner that is least 
likely to affect the woman's privacy interest. This can be accom­
plished without disclosing the names of the doctors. 116 
The Minnesota court advanced no compelling reason for dis­
closure of the doctors' names beyond the public's right to know 
about the workings of government. 117 There are less intrusive 
alternatives available through which the state could easily satisfy 
the public's legitimate informational needs without diminishing the 
patients' privacy rights. The state could furnish the names of all 
doctors who receive government reimbursement under the Medic­
aid program, but limit the description of the services to the general 
categories of surgical, medical, or psychological. 118 The state could 
also disclose the number of state funded abortions and the amount 
spent on those services without disclosing the names of the provid­
ers. Alternatively, the state could demand a showing of substantial 
need by the person requesting the information and limit the au­
thorized use of the data released. Any of these methods is prefera­
ble to disclosure of the names of abortion providers, which not 
only invades a fundamental right, but also serves no significant 
state interest. 
CONCLUSION 
In Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that the consti­
tutional right of privacy includes a woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy and that the state cannot interfere with that decision 
without advancing a compelling state interest. 119 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has effectively emasculated that right by its deci­
sion in Minnesota Medical. The court was presented with the pro­
posed disclosure by the state welfare department of sensitive infor­
mation which could have a devastating impact on the ability of 
indigent women to secure state funded abortions to which they 
116. It might be argued that disclosure would benefit those seeking to termi­
nate their pregnancies by enabling them to locate abortion providers. It is not neces­
sary or appropriate, however, for the state to disclose to the public these names. In­
dividual physicians or agencies may, if they choose, advertise their abortion services. 
For cases, providing first amendment protection to abortion advertising, see Raimer 
v. Connick, No. 73-469 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1976), afI'd sub nom. Guste v. Weeks, 429 
U.S. 1056 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The choice of whether to 
publicize available services should remain with the physician rather than the state. 
117. 274 N.W.2d at 93. 

lIB. Id. at 95 (Otis, J., dissenting). 

119. 410 U.S. at 115. 
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were entitled under the Minnesota Medicaid program. The court 
focused on the form of the interference rather than on its actual 
effect. 
On its face, disclosure appeared to be only the doctors' con­
cern, and the anticipated hostilities stemming from disclosure 
would be inflicted by private citizens rather than by the state. This 
is where the court's analysis stopped. It found no direct state inter­
ference with the patients' rights, and therefore, did not require the 
state to show that it had a compelling interest in disclosure or that 
disclosure of doctors' names was the least intrusive means of 
effectuating the state's interest in giving the public access to infor­
mation about government spending. 
The court's analysis, however, completely disregards the sub­
stance of the woman's right of privacy. The guarantee of personal 
autonomy in the abortion decision assures that the woman will be 
protected against state interference in this area of fundamental im­
portance. None of the Supreme Court privacy cases have held that 
the woman is protected only from direct interferences and not from 
indirect interferences with her right of privacy. The Court's con­
cern has been with the impact on the woman's decision rather than 
with the form that any particular interference has taken. The 
Minnesota decision, however, evidences a contrary concern for 
form over substance. It opens the door to unlimited interference 
by the state in an area which is constitutionally protected against 
the state's intrusion. 
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